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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
“Sunshine”  policy,  aimed  at  making  ﬁnancial  ties  between  health  professionals  and  industry  publicly
transparent,  has  recently  gone  global.  Given  that  transparency  is not  the  sole  means  of  managing  conﬂict
of interest,  and  is  unlikely  to be effective  on  its own,  it is  important  to understand  why  disclosure  has
emerged  as a predominant  public  policy  solution,  and  what  the  effects  of  this  focus  on  transparency  might
be.  We  used  Carol  Bacchi’s  problem-questioning  approach  to policy  analysis  to  compare  the Sunshine
policies  in  three  different  jurisdictions,  the  United  States,  France  and  Australia.  We  found  that  trans-
parency  had  emerged  as a solution  to  several  different  problems  including  misuse  of  tax  dollars,  patientharmaceutical industry
ransparency
omparative analysis
safety  and  public  trust.  Despite  these  differences  in  the  origins  of disclosure  policies,  all  were  under-
pinned  by  the questionable  assumption  that  informed  consumers  could  address  conﬂicts  of  interest.  We
conclude  that,  while  transparency  reports  have  provided  an  unprecedented  opportunity  to  understand
the  reach  of  industry  within  healthcare,  policymakers  should  build  upon  these  insights  and  begin to
develop  policy  solutions  that  address  systemic  commercial  inﬂuence.
© 2018  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC. Introduction
“Let a little bit of sunshine into this world of ﬁnancial relation-
hips − it is, after all, the best disinfectant” were United States
US) Senator Grassley’s words to the Senate in 2007 when he ﬁrst
ntroduced the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, which would
andate public disclosure of payments to physicians from phar-
aceutical and medical device companies [1]. The Sunshine Act
ecame law in the US in 2010, and “sunshine” has subsequently
one “global [2],” with numerous other countries, including France,
lovenia, Turkey, Australia and Japan, either adopting, or con-
emplating, “sunshine-like” legislation, government regulation, or
ndustry self-regulation.
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration between Health
olicy and The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
∗ Corresponding author at: D17, Level 6, The Hub, Charles Perkins Centre, The
niversity of Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia.
E-mail address: quinn.grundy@sydney.edu.au (Q. Grundy).
1 Quinn Grundy and Roojin Habibi contributed equally to this work.
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2018.03.015
168-8510/© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articl
.0/).BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
These initiatives have emerged as a result of increasing concern
about the inﬂuence of health-related industries over the decisions
of health professionals, and associated conﬂicts of interest [3].
Payments from pharmaceutical companies to physicians have gar-
nered particular attention because these relationships have been
associated with, for example, increased prescribing frequency and
cost, greater awareness of, preference for and rapid prescribing of
new drugs, decreased prescription of generic drugs, and formu-
lary addition requests for promoted drugs [4–6]. This suggests that
receipt of payments and gifts may  be contributing to escalating
healthcare costs and threats to public safety as brand name, heav-
ily marketed medications are more likely to be recalled for safety
reasons or carry black box warnings, as was  the case with Vioxx [7].
Supporters of ‘sunshine’ policies, like US Senator Grassley, advo-
cate for public reporting of health professionals’ ﬁnancial ties to
industry as a means of managing industry inﬂuence and conﬂicts of
interest. Some argue that such reporting empowers those who may
be affected by biased decision making [1]. Others hope that public
reporting will serve as a deterrent to inappropriate relationships
between health professionals and industry, allowing beneﬁcial
relationships to continue with the public’s knowledge and trust
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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8]. The pharmaceutical industry has been ambivalent about such
easures, but has publicly argued that transparency itself will build
rust by “neutrali[zing] the charge of conﬂict of interest [9].”
While these arguments for public disclosure are compelling,
ransparency is not the only way of managing conﬂicts of inter-
st arising from relationships between health professionals and
ndustry [3,10]. Other options include prohibiting certain rela-
ionships between health professionals and industry such as the
eceipt of gifts or commercial sponsorship of continuing medical
ducation [11,12], banning pharmaceutical industry representa-
ives and drug samples from clinical settings [13], strengthening
egulatory structures and promoting independence from industry
10,14,15], and putting in place processes to guide and manage the
onduct of individuals with conﬂicts of interest [16]. Disclosure
lso has limitations as a strategy for managing conﬂicts of inter-
st including promoting a view among health professionals that
anything goes” once conﬂicts have been declared (“moral licenc-
ng”); leading patients to believe that a doctor must be trustworthy
imply because he or she has been open; and creating pressure on
onsumers to comply with whatever advice might follow from a
eclaration of a conﬂict due to a fear of signalling distrust [17,18].
Given that transparency is not the sole means of managing con-
ict of interest, and may  even be counter-productive when used on
ts own, it is important to understand why disclosure has emerged
s a predominant public policy solution, and what the effects of this
ocus on transparency might be.
.1. Theoretical framework
One approach to answering such questions is offered by pol-
cy theory scholar Carol Bacchi who suggests that policy trends
f this kind can be understood by asking: what is the nature of
he problem that a particularly policy—in this case transparency
egulation—seeks to solve? In contrast to conventional understand-
ngs of public policy in which policymakers are seen as reacting to
ocial problems that exist beyond the policy process, Bacchi’s post-
tructuralist approach is premised on the understanding that policy
olutions are constitutive of particular deﬁnitions of social prob-
ems [19]. According to this formulation, policies not only reﬂect
r describe a social reality, but are also normative interventions
eclaring that something is wrong in a particular way and that a
articular kind of change is necessary. In other words, they are cre-
tive and productive efforts that shape particular understandings
f problems and that have real consequences for how stakeholders
re affected and think about themselves. For example, providing
ax credits to families with children under 5 suggests that access
o quality childcare is a problem of affordability, whereas requiring
mployers to provide parents with ﬂexible working arrangements
uggests it is a problem of the workplace. Importantly, the nature
f a social problem is rarely ofﬁcially declared or explicitly stated
20].
Rather than focusing only on whether proposed solutions (e.g.
isclosure) solve particular problems (e.g. conﬂicts of interest),
pproaching policy analysis with the question, “What is the prob-
em represented to be?” allows for a critical examination of the way
oth problems and their corresponding solutions are constituted.
his, in turn makes it possible to question the policy solution’s
nderlying assumptions, explore alternative ways of characterising
he problem, and challenge the power and governing relations that
re taken-for-granted by more instrumental approaches to policy
valuation.
With this framing in mind, we use Bacchi’s problem-questioning
pproach to policy analysis [19] to compare the Sunshine policies in
hree different jurisdictions, the United States, France and Australia.y 122 (2018) 509–518
2. Methods
2.1. Sampling
Among the OECD countries, 7 have adopted statutory
“sunshine”-type regulations: the US, France, Portugal, Greece,
Romania, Latvia and Denmark [21]. We  chose the US and France
as case studies for this comparative analysis because these were
among the earliest and most inﬂuential examples of sunshine leg-
islation. In numerous other OECD countries, including Australia,
Canada, Japan, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, some
form of public disclosure of ﬁnancial relationships between health
professionals and industry occurs through voluntary industry self-
regulation. In Australia, however, a speciﬁc, mandated form of
industry self-regulation arose through direct interaction between a
government regulator and an industry trade association (Medicines
Australia), thus we selected Australia as the third comparative case
study.
2.2. Data sources
Our principal texts for analysis were the primary and most
recent sources of the transparency policies in each of the three juris-
dictions. In the US, this was the text of the Congressional bill, the
“Physician Payments Sunshine Act of 2009”[22] and the proposed
rule from the agency responsible for promulgating this bill, the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services [23]. In France, this was the
Bertrand Law, which came into force in May  2013 as an amend-
ment to the Public Health Code [24] and was recently updated in
2017 through further legislation [25]. In Australia, the primary text
was the 18th edition of the Medicines Australia Code of Conduct
effective May  2015 [26].
We purposively sampled precursor legislation or previous edi-
tions of the primary texts and associated documents and media
releases noting amendments. We  also sampled policies, correspon-
dence, and research that were referenced in the primary texts, for
example, the authorisation of the Medicines Australia Code of Con-
duct by the regulator, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission.
2.3. Data analysis
We  used Bacchi’s stepwise analysis to critically interpret the
ways that public disclosure (a ‘solution’) has emerged in response
to the problem of conﬂict of interest [19]. For each policy, we  asked:
1. What is the ‘problem’ represented to be?
2. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?
3. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representa-
tion of the ‘problem’?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Can
the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘prob-
lem’?
6. How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been pro-
duced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned,
disrupted and replaced?
We ﬁrst describe the key features of the US, French and Aus-
tralian sunshine policies. Then, we use Bacchi’s framework to show
how a variety of problem constructions underpin otherwise similar
policy approaches. We  then critique the key assumptions inher-
ent in these problem constructions, and conclude by proposing an
alternative problem representation and policy recommendations.
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Table  1
Key characteristics of sunshine policies in the United States, France and Australia.
Characteristic United States Physician Payments
Sunshine Act
France Bertrand Law Medicines Australia Code of Conduct, 18th
Edition
Date of database
implementation
August 1, 2013 June 26, 2014 July 1, 2007
Responsible agency Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS)
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health Medicines Australia, industry trade association
Type  of policy Federal legislation, Section 6002 of the
Affordable Care Act
National legislation, Public Health Code Industry self-regulation (with mandated
disclosure for member companies)
Target industries Manufacturers of drugs, medical
devices, biologics, and medical
supplies covered by federal health
insurance programs
Manufacturers of drugs, medical
devices, biologics, medical supplies,
cosmetics, contraceptives,
biomaterials, biology test products,
contact lenses, health software,
additional “therapeutic products”
Manufacturers of prescription drugs
Payment recipients
covered
Physicians (doctors of medicine,
osteopathy, chiropractic medicine,
dentistry, podiatry, optometry)
Teaching hospitals Group purchasing
organizations
Health professionals (physicians,
nurses, pharmacists, midwives,
dieticians, medical interns and
students) health entities (professional
and patient organizations, health
publishing and software companies,
and companies providing health
professional training)
Health professionals registered to practice in
Australia who may  prescribe, dispense,
recommend, supply or administer a
prescription medicine in Australia
Type  of payments
covered
Cash Cash equivalent In-kind items or
services Stock, stock options,
ownership interests, dividends, proﬁts,
returns on investments
(totaling > USD$10 or > USD$100 per
year)
Transfers of value over D 1.00 Payments or transfers of value
Nature  of payments
covered
Consulting fees Other service fees
Honoraria Gifts Entertainment Food
and beverage Travel and lodging
Education Research Charitable
contribution Royalties or licenses
Ownership or investment interests
Speakers’ fees Grants
Agreements (including the purchase of
goods or services)
Speakers’ fees Sponsorship to attend
educational event (airfare, accommodation,
registration fees) Consulting fees Advisory
Board membership fees (sitting fees, airfare,
accommodation) Market research
participation fees Sponsorship of third party
educational meetings and symposia Health
consumer organisation support
Payments not covered Transfers of value under USD$10
Combined total of annual transfers of
value under USD$100 Product samples
for patient use Patient education
materials
Food and beverage expenditure (<AUD$120)
Consulting fees related to research and
development
Format of disclosure Open Payments, searchable, public web
database
Transparence Santé, searchable, public
web  database
Searchable table on company website and CSV
ﬁle available for download Hyperlink to
company report on Medicines Australia
website
Sanctions Failure to report: Up to US$10,000 per
violation Known failure to report: Up
to US$100,000 per violation Cap of
Deliberate omission (individuals):
D  45,000 Deliberate omission
(company): D 225,000 Additional
ons, su
ss act
es
Order to cease or withdraw promotional
activity Publicised failure to comply Complaint
forwarded to ACCC or TGA  Suspension or
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. Results
.1. Nature and scope of sunshine policies
Sunshine policies in the US, France and Australia all share
he aim of making the ties between individual health profession-
ls and health-related industries such as pharmaceutical, medical
evice or biological manufacturers publicly transparent. Table 1
rovides an overview of key characteristics of these sunshine poli-
ies. All sunshine policies focus on reporting ties of a quantiﬁable
ature between companies and individuals, and most commonly,
he monetary value of such interactions. The information is then
ade publicly available online in a variety of formats. Within these
road parameters, there are variations across jurisdictions, espe-
ially with regard to the type of transfers of value reported, the
ecipients whose payments must be accounted for, the manufactur-
rs bound by the policy, and the format in which they are rendered
o the public.
In the US, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act is a federal
egislation that requires manufacturers of drugs, medical devices,ch as suspension of
ivities or closing of
expulsion of membership Monetary ﬁnes up to
$300,000 per complaint
biologicals, and medical supplies covered by federal health insur-
ance programs to disclose transfers of value rendered to physicians
and teaching hospitals [22]. The legislation covers a broad range
of payments to physicians and teaching hospitals, valued at over
US$10, or totaling more than US$100 in one calendar year. How-
ever, it excludes product samples that are intended for patient use,
as well as educational materials that are intended to directly beneﬁt
the patient. Physicians are deﬁned as doctors of medicine, osteopa-
thy, dentistry, dental surgery, podiatry, optometry, and chiropractic
medicine. This information is publicly available through the Open
Payments website, which is managed by the Centers for Medicaid
and Medicare Services (CMS) [23]. The website offers a consumer-
facing search interface that allows the search for payments by
individual physician, teaching hospital or company. CMS  also pro-
vides ﬁles of summary data for download in analysable format.
Concerns about the omission of non-physician health profession-
als, such as nurses, pharmacists, nurse practitioners and physician
assistants in the legislation has led to the recent drafting of the
Provider Payment Sunshine Bill, which would extend the Sunshine
Act provisions to all non-physician prescribers [27].
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Table  2
Problem representations underpinning public disclosure policies in the United States, France and Australia.
Country Problem representation Illustrative examples
United States Protecting the health care consumer
• Addressing healthcare costs
•  Responsible use of tax payer dollars
• Informed choice
• Patient safety
“Increased transparency regarding the extent and nature of relationships between physicians,
teaching hospitals, and industry manufacturers will permit patients to make better informed
decisions when choosing health care professionals and making treatment decisions, and deter
inappropriate ﬁnancial relationships which can sometimes lead to increased health care costs.”
–  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid ﬁnal rule on Physician Payments Sunshine Act [23]
“This  bill will shine a much needed ray of sunlight on a situation that contributes to the
exorbitant cost of health care. Patients have the right to know if drug and device makers are
attempting to inﬂuence physician prescribing decisions with gifts, consultations and travel.”
–  Quotation from US Senator Chuck Schumer upon introduction of the Physician Payments
Sunshine Act [1]
“‘That was the whole hook,’ Thacker recalls. ‘You tie in NIH [National Institutes of Health]
money, that’s when a senator can come forward and say: ‘Hey look, you’re taking taxpayer
dollars’.”
–  Staffer Paul Thacker on rationalizing US Senator Grassley’s involvement in the issue of
conﬂicts of interest in medicine [31]
“It’s important to shed light on the millions of dollars these companies spend on marketing −
money that could be put into research or lowering the cost of prescriptions.”
–  Quotation from US Senator Klobuchar endorsing the Physician Payments Sunshine Act [32]
Precedence in Anti-Kickback legislation [33] “Such payments [from industry] could encourage
psychiatrists to use drugs in ways that endanger patients’ physical health, said Dr. Steven E.
Hyman, the provost of Harvard University and former director of the National Institute of
Mental Health. The growing use of atypicals in children is the most troubling example of this,
Dr. Hyman said.”
– From a New York Times expose on side effects in children taking antipsychotic drugs that
was  the impetus for Thacker and Grassley’s investigation [34]
Francea Threats to trust in the healthcare system and
regulator
•  Patient safety
•  Conﬂicts of interest between health
authorities and pharmaceutical companies
“In other sectors of public health and safety, the precautionary principle protects the patient.
In  [the pharmaceutical] sector, based on our investigations into the MEDIATOR® ﬁles, doubt
gave way to a propensity to keep the drug on the market. Might this tendency, different from
all  other public health sectors, be due to the close interaction between the experts and the
pharmaceutical companies? The question bears further investigation.”
–  From the report on the inquest into the drug MEDIATOR® [35]
“Restoring public trust requires the implementation of a clear provision providing solid
guarantees.  . .it is time to implement a single database, complete and coherent, of Public
Declarations of Interest. . .regardless of the role of the expert in question. The management of
public declarations of interest must be centralized under one body.”
–  From the national drug foundation working group synthesis report [36]
“Article L. 1453-1 of the Public Health Code, introduced by Article 2 of the 2011–2012 Law of
29  December 2011, aims to ensure complete transparency and improve public information
regarding ties between, on the one hand, companies producing health and cosmetic
products.  . . and on the other, various intervening actors in healthcare, especially health
professionals”
–  Instruction from the Direction Générale de la Santé to the Ministère des affaires sociales et
de  la santé [37]
“. . .[a]nother source, who declined to be identiﬁed, is worried that public conﬁdence in the
French health system is being seriously shaken after having recovered from a contaminated
blood scandal 25 years ago. The solution then was to create a public health administration,
which currently compares well with others in Europe; but to restore public conﬁdence now,
‘we  will have to look for solutions elsewhere, which will be more complicated”’
–  Quotation from Lancet article “Drug scandals in France: have the lessons been learnt?” [38]
Australia Threats to trust in the pharmaceutical industry
• Preventing discredit to the pharmaceutical
industry
• Ensuring public conﬁdence in the
pharmaceutical industry
• Keeping up with international standards
“Companies may  choose to support, initiate or become involved in activities with healthcare
professionals. Such involvement either by ﬁnancial or other means must be able to
successfully withstand public and professional scrutiny, and conform to professional and
community standards of ethics and good taste”
–  From the Medicines Australia Code of Conduct [26]
“Interactions with healthcare professionals must never be such as to bring discredit upon, or
reduce conﬁdence in the pharmaceutical industry.”
–  From the Medicines Australia Code of Conduct [26]
“Medicines Australia chief executive Tim James said the code would improve transparency
and  increase patient conﬁdence that the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry
and healthcare professionals was  appropriate. ‘The code shows the leadership and integrity of
the Australian pharmaceutical industry,’ Mr James said.”
– As reported in the Sydney Morning Herald [39]
“Improving transparency around payments to individual doctors will play an important role in
promoting community conﬁdence in the integrity of these payments to healthcare
professionals.”
–  Quotation from ACCC Commissioner upon granting conditional approval of Medicines
Australia 17th ed of the Code of Conduct [40]
“We  also call on Australia’s elected representatives to consider introducing legislation similar
to  the Sunshine Act, to bring Australia into line with international benchmarks on
transparency in healthcare.”
– Preamble to petition from healthcare activists [41]
a Illustrative quotations originally in French were translated to English by Roojin Habibi.
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In France, the Bertrand Law, which was entered into force in May
013 as an amendment to the Public Health Code [24] requires that
ayments to health professionals and health entities be accessible
n the government website Transparence-Sante [25]. Although ini-
ially inspired by the US, France’s legislation is broader in scope in
erms of professionals and products covered as well as the thresh-
ld for disclosure. Under these provisions, any direct or indirect
ransfers of value over D 1 to health professionals, including physi-
ians, nurses, pharmacists, midwives, dieticians, medical interns
nd students, as well as health entities, including professional and
atient organizations, and health education, publishing and soft-
are companies, must be reported. A wider range of health-related
ndustries fall under the purview of the French sunshine policy,
ncluding manufacturers of cosmetics and contraceptives.
In Australia, the pharmaceutical industry is governed mainly
hrough self-regulation overseen by Medicines Australia, the
ational trade association for manufacturers of prescription
edicines. Transparency provisions are set out in Medicines
ustralia’s Code of Conduct for ethical marketing and promotion
26]. The Code of Conduct, including the transparency provi-
ions, is enforced for member companies, although membership in
edicines Australia is voluntary and these provisions do not apply
o non-member pharmaceutical companies operating in Australia,
or to manufacturers of over-the-counter or generic medicines.
hile the Medicines Australia Code is a form of industry self-
egulation, it is under the oversight of the Australian Competition
nd Consumer Commission (ACCC), whose responsibility is to
nsure that businesses and individuals comply with competition,
air trading, and consumer protection laws [28]. In exchange for safe
arbour provisions under anti-competition legislation, the ACCC
eviews and grants Medicines Australia conditional approval of the
ode of Conduct for up to ﬁve-year periods [28].
Australia was one of the ﬁrst countries to introduce trans-
arency policies related to pharmaceutical company payments to
ealth professionals in 2007, however, payments were reported in
ggregate and made public in PDF format [29]. Further transparency
rovisions have been included as part of the 18th edition of the
ndustry’s Code of Conduct for ethical marketing and promotion,
hich requires reporting of transfers of value to individual health
rofessionals in analysable format on individual company web-
ites [26]. Under the Code, Medicines Australia member companies
re required to report transfers of value related to prescription
edicines, including payments for consulting or advisory board
embership, sponsorship to attend an educational event including
ravel, and speaker honoraria and travel support. Health profes-
ionals covered under this reporting include any registered health
rofessional “who in the course of their professional activities may
rescribe, dispense, recommend, supply or administer a prescrip-
ion medicine in Australia.” [26] Notable omissions include the
eceipt of food or beverages, which were deemed “secondary” to
ther transfers of value and because the Code already stipulates
 $120 spending threshold per person per meal [26]. Authoriza-
ion of this revision of the Code has been granted by the ACCC on
ondition that Medicines Australia takes reasonable measures to
evelop and implement a Central Reporting System where trans-
ers of value to individual health professionals would be made both
isible and in an analysable format in a centralized repository.[28]
ince 2015, Medicines Australia’s Centralised Database Working
roup has been investigating the feasibility of implementing a cen-
ral reporting database in order to comply with the mandate [30].
.2. Problem representations and how they came aboutThe public discourse around the introduction of transparency
olicies in the US, France and Australia characterised a range of
roblems to which public disclosure of ﬁnancial ties betweeny 122 (2018) 509–518 513
health professionals and industry was  the proposed solution.
Table 2 provides illustrative examples of this range of problem rep-
resentations across the three countries. In response to Bacchi’s ﬁrst
and second questions, “what is the problem represented to be?” and
“how did it come about?” we describe the dominant problem rep-
resentations below and provide a narrative analysis of how these
particular problem representations came about.
3.2.1. Protecting the healthcare consumer: the United States
In the US, transparency initiatives have tended to be justiﬁed
as a means to ensure the ethical and rational spending of tax-
payer dollars. Scrutiny of ﬁnancial ties between physicians and
drug manufacturers has a long history in the US in the form of the
federal Anti-Kickback Statute as well as being under the purview
of the Ofﬁce of the Inspector General [33]. These policies ensure
that relationships between physicians and industry do not result
in inducements that could result in preferential referral or recom-
mendation of products or services covered by federal health care
programs. Several states, including Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont
and Minnesota experimented with public disclosure laws as early
as the 1990s [42]. Public reporting of physicians’ ﬁnancial ties was
also spearheaded by ProPublica, a team of investigative journalists
who, in 2010, established a publicly searchable payments database,
Dollars for Docs. Initially, the data were compiled using reports dis-
closed through legal settlements between certain companies and
the federal government [43].
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act was formally introduced
in 2007 by US Senator Charles Grassley, with co-sponsorship from
Senator Herb Kohl [44]. As a senior member of the Senate Finance
Committee, Senator Grassley justiﬁed the need for a transition
from ad hoc public reporting to a systematic and federal initia-
tive primarily on the basis that public reporting of ﬁnancial ties
between physicians and industry would shed light on inﬂuential
relationships that contribute to the “exorbitant cost of healthcare”
and misuse of public dollars [1,31]. To bolster their case for the
need for greater protection of healthcare consumers, Grassley and
Paul Thacker, an journalist, investigated the ﬁnancial disclosures
of academic physicians receiving grants from the federally-funded
National Institutes of Health (NIH). Under federal rules, NIH grant
recipients are required to disclose to their universities ﬁnancial
interests of more than $10,000 in cash or 5% equity in a com-
pany. Between 2007 and 2008, Grassley and Thacker’s audits of
the mandatory disclosures of academic physicians revealed that
over 50 researchers afﬁliated with more than 30 universities had
failed to disclose sums as high as $800,000 in payments received
from industry [31]. Possibly as a result of the substantial negative
publicity generated as a result of these investigations, pharmaceu-
tical companies began to publicly accede that transparency was
required, pending revisions of the proposed bill [45]. The bill was
eventually endorsed by the American Medical Association, Pharma-
ceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, and the American
Academy of Family Physicians, among others [32]. It garnered fur-
ther momentum when President Obama placed the Senate Finance
Committee in charge of drafting the 2010 Patient Care and Afford-
able Care Act, which included the Sunshine Act as an amendment.
With its roots in anti-kickback policies and through direct con-
sultation with the Inspector General, the ﬁnal rule of the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act explicitly acknowledged that payments
from manufacturers to physicians could inﬂuence decision-making
in ways that could compromise patient care and “lead to increased
health care costs ”[23]. Though recognizing that disclosure alone
will not differentiate between beneﬁcial and problematic relation-
ships, transparency was  promoted as a solution to the problem
of threats to consumer protection by bolstering “better informed
decisions” on part of healthcare consumers [23].
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.2.2. Rebuilding public trust in the health care system: France
In contrast to the US, where the Sunshine Act evolved gradu-
lly out of a series of strategic investigations into the (mis)use of
axpayer dollars, France’s Sunshine legislation emerged suddenly
n 2011 in the aftermath of a public health crisis that profoundly
estabilized public trust in the French drug regulation system. The
rench law was therefore framed as a policy response to an explicit
nd urgent deﬁciency of trustworthiness in the health care system.
In the late 1990s, discoveries about the cardiotoxic properties
f fenﬂuramines (appetite suppressants used to manage obesity-
elated conditions) led to their withdrawal from drug markets
orldwide. However, one of these drugs, benﬂuorex (Mediator
®
),
pproved in France to control diabetes-related lipid levels, contin-
ed to be marketed and prescribed to patients, especially patients
ith weight concerns, more than ten years after the purge of fen-
uramines in other countries [46]. During this time, the drug’s
anufacturer, Servier, engaged in off-label marketing of the drug
or weight loss [35]. By the time the drug was withdrawn from the
rench market in 2009, an estimated 500–2000 deaths had been
inked to its use, mostly in an off-label context [46,47].
The slow response of regulators and health professionals pro-
oked a sudden wave of public and media scorn. Investigations
nto how benﬂuorex managed to penetrate and stay on the French
arket for so long quickly led to inconvenient truths about the
xtent of conﬂicts of interest in the French healthcare system [48].
s an indication of the shockwaves sent through the health commu-
ity, the head of the drug regulatory agency stepped down, and the
rench pharmaceutical industry association ‘LEEM’ ousted Servier
rom their membership [48].
The response of then-Health Minister Xavier Bertrand was rapid,
s he convened public consultations with over 350 stakeholders
ncluding representatives of industry, health professionals, educa-
ors, regulators, politicians and consumer groups [36]. Inspired in
art by the recent success of the Physician Payments Sunshine Act
n the United States, one of the recommendations emerging from
takeholder consultations was to codify an obligation on health-
elated industries to report ﬁnancial ties to health professionals
36].
In 2012, this obligation became law with article 2 of the Bertrand
aw, now codiﬁed as article L. 1453-1 of the Public Health Code,
hich mandated the establishment of a public database document-
ng health professionals’ ties to medically-related industries [24].
n a speech to the Senate, the Health Minister explained that the
rimary goal of the law reform was to ward off conﬂicts of interest
nd promote the transparency of decisions in healthcare [49].
Despite these promises, a number of loopholes remained from
he way that legislators interpreted the Bertrand Law [50]: of most
igniﬁcance, contracts between industry and health profession-
ls for work or services provided, including the monetary value
f the resulting remunerations or fees, was excluded from report-
ng requirements [51]. In 2015, this issue was brought before the
ouncil of State, which voted unanimously in favour of abolishing
revious restrictions on disclosed information [52]. By the end of
016, a new decree was issued, reﬂecting this decision and requir-
ng additional reporting, which includes the type of relationship,
he monetary value of the payment (if over D 10), the precise sub-
ect matter of the contract, and details of all beneﬁciaries [25]. These
hanges came into effect in July 2017.
Despite signiﬁcant efforts to reform the French sunshine law,
ritics argue that the post-benﬂuorex era has been primarily
ocused on conﬂicts of interest between health professionals and
he industry, neglecting the fact that the drug regulatory agency and
ther public ofﬁcials were equally found to have failed to address
he evidence pointing the drug toxicity [35]. In the words of Bernard
ebré, physician and Member of Parliament, “ [c]onﬂict of interesty 122 (2018) 509–518
remains rife [and] the pharmaceutical lobby is as powerful as ever”
[38].
3.2.3. Preserving the public image of the pharmaceutical
industry: Australia
In 2007, Australia became one of the ﬁrst countries to intro-
duce transparency policies related to pharmaceutical company
payments to health professionals, allowing then chief executive of
the pharmaceutical industry trade association, Medicines Australia,
to claim “The Australian pharmaceutical industry is now the global
leader in terms of transparency and accountability” [53]. This state-
ment reﬂects the dominant problem representation underpinning
transparency initiatives in Australia, which focuses on preserving
the public image of the pharmaceutical industry and keeping up
with international policy efforts. Explaining that, “[n]o one knows
more about pharmaceuticals than the people who  make them,”
then chief executive of Medicines Australia Ian Chalmers publi-
cized, “I hope the publication of this report gives the community a
better sense of the contribution the pharmaceutical industry makes
to our healthcare system by saving, improving or prolonging the
lives of Australians”[53].
Despite these claims of global leadership on the part of the phar-
maceutical industry, payments to health professionals were ﬁrst
reported in aggregate and made public in PDF format by individual
companies, making it difﬁcult to search, conduct analyses or detect
patterns across companies [29]. Spurred by the debates about the
2007 Sunshine bill in the US, stakeholders began to call for similar
policy in Australia, and the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) critiqued the lack of transparency provisions
in the then 16th edition of Medicines Australia’s Code of Conduct
[54]. In 2013, subsequent to the passing of the United States Sun-
shine Act, the ACCC approved Medicines Australia’s 17th edition of
their Code for only two years instead of the standard ﬁve, with the
directive to improve transparency of payments and sponsorship
made by pharmaceutical companies to individual healthcare pro-
fessionals [40]. Over 450 health researchers and practitioners also
signed a petition for the ACCC to introduce some form of sunshine
policy in Australia [41]. The regulator again framed the problem as
one of threats to public trust in the industry, explaining, “Improving
transparency around payments to individual doctors will play an
important role in promoting community conﬁdence in the integrity
of these payments to healthcare professionals ”[40].
In 2015, new transparency provisions were delivered in the 18th
Edition of the Medicines Australia Code of Conduct, which require
reporting of transfers of value to individual health professionals in
analysable format (i.e. CSV ﬁles) on individual company websites
[26]. The ACCC granted authorization of the most recent revision
of the Code on condition that Medicines Australia takes reasonable
measures to develop and implement a Central Reporting System
where transfers of value to individual health professionals will be
made both visible and in an analysable format in a centralized
repository [28].
While Medicines Australia publicly endorsed its new trans-
parency rules, the idea of publicly disclosing ﬁnancial ties between
health professionals and industry seemed to hold little appeal
for Medicines Australia at the outset. In a speech to an Aus-
tralian professional development conference in Sydney in 2012,
then-President Brendan Shaw imparted his fear thatIf medicines
companies were to just start publishing the names of doctors and
the amounts of sponsorship without any bedrock of understanding
of the importance of that work, the resulting commentary would
border on a witch hunt. . .it would make the Spanish Inquisition
look like a Sunday church picnic [55].
The industry organisation was not alone in this stance. The
Australian Medical Association also cautioned the ACCC against
including sweeping transparency provisions in the Code [56]. How-
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ver, over 450 health professionals advocated for public disclosure,
igning a petition that called on Australia to keep up with “inter-
ational benchmarks on transparency in healthcare,” providing the
CCC with a legitimating voice from within the medical profession
41]. By June 2013, likely owing to the pressure imposed by the
CCC and advocate groups, Medicines Australia’s stance changed
n favour of transparency. This time, Shaw boasted about the
ody’s new transparency model, recognizing that while “[industry]
ngagement with doctors [was] important and legitimate because
atients want to be sure that their doctors know how to use
he medicines they’re being prescribed,” transparency about this
ngagement would build “public trust and conﬁdence in those
elationships”[57]. Australia’s move towards public disclosure of
ndustry ties thus seems to be have been driven primarily by a
esire to remain in compliance with the regulator, but has also
een treated as a public relations opportunity to instill trust in the
ndustry.
. Discussion
.1. Underlying assumptions, silences, and effects
Our application of Steps 1 and 2 of Bacchi’s framework illus-
rates that a variety of problem constructions underpin otherwise
imilar policy approaches, focused on public disclosure of industry
nteractions (Table 2). Though each jurisdiction presented multiple
nd sometimes overlapping problem representations, we identi-
ed a dominant problem framing that was speciﬁc to each context.
n the US, the problem was largely characterised as a matter of con-
umer protection and the misuse of taxpayer dollars. In France, it
as characterised as an issue of patient safety, the trustworthiness
f the medical profession and the adequacy of regulatory systems.
nd in Australia, it was characterised primarily as a lack of open-
ess and accountability on the part of the prescription medicines
ndustry, and as a failure of Australian regulators to keep up with
nternational benchmarks. However, despite the variation in prob-
em representations each manifest problem (or set of problems)
as been implicitly assumed to stem from a common underlying
roblem – a lack of transparency. As such, disclosure has emerged
s the proposed solution in all three jurisdictions.
It may  be that lack of transparency does, in fact, contribute to
ach of the manifest problems outlined above, and that disclosure
ould be an important means of addressing them. However, the
xclusive focus on a lack of transparency as the “core” problem,
nd disclosure as the key solution, reveals a shared set of broader
ssumptions, not only about conﬂicts of interest and their manage-
ent, but also about healthcare and its relationship to industry, and
bout healthcare systems, markets and professions more generally.
n order to explore and critique these assumptions, we  now turn
o Bacchi’s third question: “What presuppositions or assumptions
nderlie this representation of the ‘problem’?” and her fourth ques-
ion “What is left unproblematic in this problem representation?”
e then reﬂect on the effects of these assumptions and silences for
atients and the public at large (question ﬁve).
The most obvious presupposition underpinning the three disclo-
ure policies is that lack of transparency is the primary cause of a
ide variety of problems (waste of taxpayer dollars, regulatory fail-
re, and lack of industry accountability) and, correspondingly, that
isclosure is a necessary and sufﬁcient means of managing these
roblems. As we explained earlier, there are a number of problems
ith the assumption that disclosure is, on its own, a satisfactory
pproach to managing conﬂict of interest [17]. Given that we know
hat disclosure can have paradoxical effects on professional and
ndustry behaviour, it seems naïve to assume that disclosure would,
n its own, ensure that tax dollars are not wasted (US), patients’y 122 (2018) 509–518 515
safety is secured (France), and trust in the pharmaceutical indus-
try is maintained (Australia). Our skepticism is buttressed by the
fact that none of the sunshine policies that we analysed articu-
lated exactly how public disclosure is meant to solve whatever the
manifest problem might be. For example, the ﬁnal rule for the US
Physician Payments Sunshine Act explains that increased trans-
parency will “deter inappropriate ﬁnancial relationships which can
sometimes lead to increased health care costs” without identify-
ing which ﬁnancial relationships are considered “inappropriate”
or placing any limits on the same [23]. Similarly, even in France,
where the concern was over public safety, and the sunshine policy
was supported by a variety of government-consulted stakeholder
groups, proponents of the policy have provided few details on
precisely how disclosure of payments rendered to health profes-
sionals might help to avoid a similar public health crisis in the
future. Rather, as evidenced by the shifting public stance of the Aus-
tralian pharmaceutical industry towards transparency mandates,
disclosure seems to have emerged as a palatable political solution
that allows governments to appear responsive to public concerns
and health-related industries to appear credible and compliant
while avoiding actual regulation of their marketing activities.To
the extent that the policies we analysed do refer to their supposed
mechanism of action, this is limited to vague references to the role
of disclosure in promoting consumer choice − the idea apparently
being that information will empower the average healthcare con-
sumer to choose his or her healthcare provider, and thereby send
a signal to the market that unethical, biased or compromised prac-
tices will be commercially unviable. This mechanism was  framed by
US Senator Kohl as a “win-win” for consumers, explaining, the phar-
maceutical industry told the Aging Committee that they believe
their practices are above-board. If that is the case, full disclosure
will only serve to prove them right. If that is not the case, full dis-
closure will bring their inﬂuence-peddling out from the shadows.
Either way, patients win  [1].
All three sunshine policies therefore, seem to be premised on
the principle of caveat emptor, where the burden of responsibility
for assessing the adverse outcomes of conﬂict of interest is shifted
to those on the receiving end of healthcare [58]. This is, however,
problematic partly because, as discussed above, patients may  not
be able to interpret disclosures and partly because they may  not be
able to act on the knowledge they have. In this regard, it is notewor-
thy that although a recent systematic review [59] and randomized
controlled trial [60] found that receipt of payments may be associ-
ated with decreased public trust in physicians, patients are rarely
in a position to seek an unconﬂicted second opinion or to reject
their primary physician’s advice due to a fear of signalling distrust
[18,61].
4.2. How could the problem and its solution be thought about
differently?
If we accept that the current rationale for public disclosure is
underpinned by problematic assumptions about both the cause of
the problem (lack of transparency) and the solution (disclosure),
then this leads us to Bacchi’s ﬁnal question, which asks how the
problem representation could be disrupted and replaced.
We believe that the answer to this question lies in reframing
the problem of conﬂict of interest so that it is seen not solely or
even primarily as one of lack of transparency, but rather as one of
excessive dependence of biomedicine on health-related industries.
This, in turn, has major implications for the management of conﬂict
of interest, for If the problem is represented as a problem of inde-
pendence rather than transparency, then this suggests the need for
systemic, structural reforms to address industry inﬂuence within
healthcare.
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Table  3
An alternative problem representation and policy solutions for conﬂicts of interest in healthcare.
Problem representation Key assumptions Policy solutions
Lack of transparency Informed consumers can differentiate between appropriate
and inappropriate relationships between health professionals
and industry
Public reporting of speciﬁc ﬁnancial relationships between
health professionals and medically-related industry
Public scrutiny will act as a deterrent to inappropriate ﬁnancial
relationships
Focus on prescribers and prescribing decisions as a
quantiﬁable measure of industry inﬂuence
Inappropriate relationships have the potential
to  inﬂuence individual healthcare
decision-making
Report payments to identiﬁed individuals
Create public-facing, searchable interface for healthcare
consumers
Lack  of independence A power differential exists between patients and health
professionals
Prohibit certain marketing activities targeted at health
professionals such as the provision of gifts, entertainment,
food and beverage
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While this would not be easy, greater independence could be
chieved by an increased investment of public funds in research and
evelopment of new medicines thereby reducing reliance on indus-
ry or pooling of industry research funds so that they are entirely
n the control of public researchers; ensuring that health profes-
ional training programs are free from commercial inﬂuence; and
he establishment of an independent body to conduct continuing
edical education of health professionals [3,14,15].
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the discourse surrounding
he sunshine policies in all three jurisdictions we analysed seemed
o imply that, simply by “letting the light in,” regulators have per-
ormed their required duty when it comes to managing conﬂict
f interest. Consequently, there has been relative silence on the
eed to manage (rather than simply make transparent) interac-
ions between industry and the health professions. Although each
f the jurisdictions we analysed has anti-bribery or anti-kickback
egislation, this legislation is rarely applied to the routine interac-
ions between health professionals and industry that are captured
y transparency reports. And while policymakers would seem to
e well-justiﬁed if they decided to prohibit the kinds of payments
r gifts that are known to be associated with negative prescribing
utcomes [4–6], none of the three sample jurisdictions, or any oth-
rs to our knowledge, have taken this policy step. Table 3 presents
n alternative problem representation for conﬂicts of interest and
nsuing policy solutions.
If this alternative problem representation (dependence vs. lack
f transparency) is accepted, then the question becomes: what, if
ny, role do disclosure policies have in the management of conﬂict
f interest? We  believe that these policies serve a crucial role by
aking it possible to systematically document and therefore ren-
er susceptible to research and structural intervention the impact
f ﬁnancial ties on healthcare practices and health outcomes. For
xample, it was disclosure that made possible the analysis that
howed that even modest payments, such as a $20 meal, are sig-
iﬁcantly associated with increased prescription of brand-name
rugs [5], – a ﬁnding that can now be used to build a case for more
eﬁnitive policy action.
The potential for a symbiotic relationship between disclosure
nd management of conﬂict of interest is evident in Australia where
 regulator, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACCC) – oversees the industry trade association that implements
ublic disclosure. The ACCC enforces competition law, but also fair
rading and key consumer protections. Thus, while reinforcing the
ssumption that disclosure is a form of caveat emptor in one sense,
n another sense, this regulator is able to oversee multiple facets
f marketing by health-related industry that may  threaten pub-
ic health. For example, the ACCC recently took Reckitt Benckiser
o court over allegations that the company mislead consumers
hrough marketing speciﬁc pain indications for the same over-Prohibit sales representatives from accessing clinical spaces
ionals
try
Ensure the ﬁnancial and advisory independence of healthcare
regulators
the-counter medication [62]. The ACCC similarly, took legal action
against Pﬁzer over allegations that the company misused its market
position in supplying atorvastatin to pharmacies [63].
Importantly, bringing disclosure policy under the purview of a
competition and consumer protection agency positions payments
and gifts to health professionals as a marketing strategy and one
that is both anti-competitive and potentially harmful to consumers.
While Australia is not necessarily ahead of other jurisdictions in
terms of reducing dependence on industry and is far behind France
and the US in terms of the quality of public transparency reporting,
the dual commitments of the ACCC – to both consumer empow-
erment and protection – shows that a commitment to the former
does not necessarily preclude equal commitment to the latter.
4.3. Other lessons from comparisons of sunshine policies
For disclosure to function as an effective tool for guiding struc-
tural intervention, it is crucial that disclosures are complete,
accessible and analysable. In addition to highlighting the limita-
tions of using public disclosure as the sole or primary means of
managing conﬂict of interest, our comparison among the three
jurisdictions highlights several differences among the jurisdictions
from which important practical lessons can be drawn in terms of
improving the quality and utility of disclosures.
First, the three systems of public disclosure that we analysed
differ in terms of the threshold for which disclosure is triggered,
with France being the most comprehensive requiring disclosure
of any payment over D 1. Both the US and Australia, in contrast,
set higher thresholds and exclude particular exchanges of value,
most notably food and beverage in the Australian context. The jus-
tiﬁcations given for using high(er) thresholds and for excluding
food and beverages is that the alternative would be both exces-
sively burdensome and unnecessary as these exchanges of value
are morally insigniﬁcant. This provision, however, ignores the fact
that small gifts and other transfers of value can have just as much
of an inﬂuence as larger ones [5,64], and the sustainability of the
French system demonstrates that reporting of small gifts and meals
is not, in fact, unmanageably burdensome.
Second, there was considerable variation among the three juris-
dictions in the types of health professionals that are included in
disclosure mandates. In the US, the mandate is restricted to physi-
cians though nurse practitioners, physician assistants and some
pharmacists also routinely prescribe treatments. This reveals an
assumption that prescribers are the only signiﬁcant “decision mak-
ers” and thus the only group that is susceptible to biases resulting
from conﬂicts of interest [65]. This assumption is, however, not in
keeping with what industry appears to know about health care pur-
chasing and clinical decision-making. For example, recent analysis
of the Australian transparency reports found that 40% of pharma-
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eutical industry-sponsored events for health professionals had at
east one registered nurse in attendance, a category of health pro-
essional in Australia currently with only very limited authority to
rescribe [66]. The French and Australian policies, in contrast, are
uch more inclusive, covering any registered health professional
hat might be involved in patient care or handling of medicines.
otably, the French policy also includes health professional stu-
ents, thus demonstrating that greater inclusiveness is indeed
ossible and that conﬂicts of interest are relevant across professions
nd career stages.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that all three policies focus
heir attention solely on health professionals and exclude interac-
ions between industry and non-clinicians such as administrators
r researchers or patient advocates, despite the fact that all of
hese groups may  exert a great deal of inﬂuence of healthcare
ecision-making. There is also limited inclusion of collective actors
nd institutions − teaching hospitals in the US and corporate
odies such as universities or professional associations in France.
owever, industry has considerable inﬂuence over professional
ssociations, academic journals and their publishers, and academic
eaching hospitals and universities. There is, therefore, room for
mprovement in all three policies with respect to the kinds of actors
hose relationships with industry are deemed worthy of disclo-
ure.
Finally, our comparative analysis highlighted that the meaning
f “transparency” differs among jurisdictions in terms of the types
f data and format in which it was made available (Table 1). While
ll three jurisdictions made ties between health professionals and
ndustry visible,  the Australian policy did little to assist those who
ight want to analyse these data. Historically, Medicines Australia
ade their transparency reports available in PDF format, with sepa-
ate PDFs for each company and reporting period, which precluded
omprehensive analysis. One of the ACCC’s conditions for approval
f Medicine Australia’s most recent Code of Conduct was that they
ould make efforts to provide reports in an analysable format.
hile the recent reports of individual payments to health profes-
ionals are now available in CSV format, they are not provided in
ggregate, but instead are located separately on each member com-
any’s website. This creates additional barriers to understanding
atterns of health professional-industry relationships across com-
anies, or to ascertain whether individual health professionals are
eceiving payments from multiple companies. Further, Medicines
ustralia does not provide a searchable database that is consumer-
acing. In the US and France, in contrast, have public websites
roviding search interfaces that enable consumers to look up the
ayments attributed to individual health professionals, pharma-
eutical or medical device companies or other covered entities such
s teaching hospitals. These jurisdictions thus provide useful mod-
ls for ensuring that disclosure is not simply a ceremony, but rather
 genuine effort to promote trust and public transparency.
Taken together, these observations illustrate that there is sim-
ly no basis for claims that disclosure processes need to be limited
ith respect to the size and scope of interactions that are included;
he individuals and groups whose activities are made visible; or the
ays in which data are presented and made available for analysis.
he basic tools needed for effective and meaningful transparency
xist, and could be instituted by any jurisdiction that was sufﬁ-
iently motivated.
. ConclusionTransparency is an essential part of the solution to conﬂict of
nterest because it makes visible the nature and scope of indus-
ry inﬂuence over healthcare. However, transparency on its own is
nsufﬁcient in ensuring the independence of health professionals,
[
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regulators and health systems. Mapping the emergence of sun-
shine policies across three different countries and critiquing the
assumptions underpinning these policies lays the groundwork for
greater critical engagement with transparency policies as a means
of addressing conﬂict of interest. Transparency reports have pro-
vided an unprecedented opportunity to understand the reach of
medically-related industry within healthcare and particularly, over
the decision of health professionals. Policymakers should build
upon these insights and use them as the basis for informed policy
solutions that address this inﬂuence.
Funding
This study was funded by a National Health & Medical Research
Council Project Grant (APP1059732). Dr Grundy is supported by
a postdoctoral fellowship from the Canadian Institutes of Health
Research.
Conﬂict of interest
The authors have no conﬂicts of interest to declare.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2018.03.
015.
References
[1] Grassley C, Grassley. Kohl say public should know when pharmaceutical makers
give money to doctors. Washington, DC: Ofﬁce of Senator Grassley; 2007.
[2] Campbell D, Sharkey B. Ready or not, full speed ahead for the global trans-
parency movement. Morristown, NJ: 2015; 2018.
[3] Institute of Medicine. Conﬂict of interest in medical research, education and
practice. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press; 2009.
[4] Yeh JS, Franklin JM,  Avorn J, Landon J, Kesselheim AS. Association of industry
payments to physicians with the prescribing of brand-name statins in Mas-
sachusetts. JAMA Internal Medicine 2016;176(6):763–8.
[5] DeJong C, Aguilar T, Tseng TS, Lin GA, Boscardin WJ,  Dudley RA. Pharmaceuti-
cal  industry–sponsored meals and physician prescribing patterns for medicare
beneﬁciaries. JAMA Internal Medicine 2016;176(8):1114–22.
[6] Ornstein C, Grochowski Jones R, Tigas M. Now there’s proof: Docs who get
company cash tend to prescribe more brand-name meds, in ProPublica. New
York, NY: ProPublica Inc.; 2016.
[7] Pew Prescription Project. Addressing cost and quality: The Physician Payments
Sunshine Act. Pennsylvania, PA: Pew Foundation; 2009.
[8] Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Open Payments Data in Con-
text; 2016 [cited 2016 October 18]; Available from: https://www.cms.gov/
OpenPayments/About/Open-Payments-Data-in-Context.html.
[9] Blackwell T. Canadian drug companies agree to divulge how much they pay
doctors, health groups, in National Post. Toronto, ON: Postmedia Network Inc.;
2016.
10] Rodwin MA. Conﬂicts of interest, institutional corruption, and pharma: an
agenda for reform. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 2012;40(3):511–22.
11] Smith S, Hams M,  Wilkinson W.  Conﬂict of interest policy guide for medi-
cal schools and academic medical centers; 2013 [cited 2017 September 27];
Available from: https://www.communitycatalyst.org/initiatives-and-issues/
initiatives/prescription-reform/conﬂict-of-interest-policy-guide.
12] Chimonas S, DiLorenzo M,  Rothman DJ. Paradigms of change: case studies in
transforming physician-industry interactions. Journal of Entrepreneurship and
Organisation Management 2016;5(3):1000195.
13] Evans D, Hartung DM,  Beasley D, Fagnan LJ. Breaking up is hard to do: lessons
learned from a pharma-free practice transformation. Journal of the American
Board of Family Medicine 2013;26(3):332–8.
14] Angell M.  The truth about the drug companies: how they deceive us and what
to do about it. New York, NY: Random House; 2005.
15] Lexchin J. Private proﬁts vs public policy: the pharmaceutical industry and the
Canadian state. Toronto, ON: The University of Toronto Press; 2016.16] Boyd EA, Bero LA. Deﬁning ﬁnancial conﬂicts and managing research relation-
ships: an analysis of university conﬂict of interest committee decisions. Science
and Engineering Ethics 2007;13(4):415–35.
17] Loewenstein G, Sah S, Cain DM.  The unintended consequences of conﬂict of
interest disclosure. JAMA 2012;307(7):669–70.
5 h Polic
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
invisible interactions between registered nurses and industry. Annals of Inter-18 Q. Grundy et al. / Healt
18] Sah S, Loewenstein G, Cain DM.  The burden of disclosure: increased com-
pliance with distrusted advice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
2013;104(2):289–304.
19] Bacchi C. Analysing policy: what’s the problem represented to be?, 1st ed.
Frenchs Forest, NSW: Pearson Education; 2009.
20] Bacchi C. Policy as discourse: what does it mean? Where does it get us? Dis-
course 2000;21(1):45–57.
21] Santos A. The sun shines on Europe: transparency of ﬁnancial relationships
in  the healthcare sector. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Health Action Interna-
tional; 2017.
22] S.301, Physician Payments Sunshine Act, 111th Congress (2009–2010), Library
of Congress; Washington, DC.
23] Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). In: C.f.M.M.S. (CMS), edi-
tor. Medicare, Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs: transparency
reports and reporting of physician ownership or investment interests. C.F.R;
2013.
24] Loi N◦ 2011–2012 Du 29 Décembre 2011 Relative Au Renforcement De La Sécurité
Sanitaire Du Médicament Et Des Produits De Santé. 2011, Légifrance: Paris, France.
25] Ministère des Affaires sociales et de la Santé. Base transparence santé; 2016
[cited 2016 October 18] Available from: https://www.transparence.sante.
gouv.fr/ﬂow/main;jsessionid=A96BC2B939D220F1CD5B6D934E5CCB31.
sunshine-public?execution=e1s1.
26] Medicines Australia. Code of Conduct; 2015. Deakin, ACT.
27] Ornstein C. Bill would add nurses, physician assistants to pharma payments
database. ProPublica; 2015 [cited 2015 October 8]; Available from: http://
www.propublica.org/article/bill-would-add-nurses-physician-assistants-to-
pharma-payments-database.
28] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission. Medicines Australia Limited
application for revocation of authorisations A91316-A91320 and substitution
of  new authorisations A91436-A91440–proposed conditions of authorisation;
2015. Canberra, ACT.
29] Roberston J, Moynihan R, Walkom E, Bero L, Henry D. Mandatory disclo-
sure of pharmaceutical industry-funded events for health professionals. PLOS
Medicine 2009;6(11):e1000128.
30] Medicines Australia. Central database working group; 2017 [cited 2017
October 3]; Available from: https://medicinesaustralia.com.au/code-of-
conduct/transparency-reporting/central-database-working-group/.
31] Wadman M.  Money in biomedicine: the senator’s sleuth. Nature
2009;461(7262):330–4.
32] Grassley C. Senators welcome endorsements of Physician Payments Sunshine
Act. Washington, DC: Ofﬁce of Senator Grassley; 2008.
33] Conn L, Vernaglia L. Shining the light on physician–pharmaceutical and
medical device industry ﬁnancial relationships. Journal of Vascular Surgery
2011;54(Suppl. 3):22S–5S.
34] Harris G, Carey B, Roberts J. Psychiatrists, troubled children and the drug indus-
try’s role, in The New York Times. New York, NY: The New York Times Company;
2007. p. A1.
35] Morelle A, Bensadon A, Marie E. Enquête sur le Mediator® ; 2011. Paris, France.
36] Couty E, Lesueur T. Rapport de synthèse des assises du médicament. Paris,
France: Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Santé; 2011.
37] Ministère des Affaires sociales et de la Santé. CIRCULAIRE N◦ DGS/PF2/2013/224
du 29 mai  2013 relative à l’application de l’article 2 de la loi n◦2011-2012 du
29 décembre 2011 relative au renforcement de la sécurité sanitaire du médica-
ment et des produits de santé. Paris, France: La ministre des affaires sociales et
de  la santé; 2013.
38] Casassus B. Drug scandals in France: have the lessons been learnt? The Lancet
2016;388(10044):550–2.
39] Harrison D. Transparency on drug company payments and trips for doctors a
step closer. In: Sydney Morning Herald. Sydney, NSW: Fairfax Media; 2015.
40] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission. ACCC calls on Medicines
Australia to improve disclosure of payments to individual healthcare profes-
sionals. Canberra, ACT: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission; 2012.
41] Harvey K. Petition to ACCC on Medicines Australia Code Authorisation;
2012 [cited 2016 October 18]; Available from: https://www.gopetition.com/
petitions/petition-to-accc-on-medicines-australia-code-authorisat.html.
[y 122 (2018) 509–518
42] Agrawal S, Brennan N, Budetti P. The Sunshine Act — effects on physicians. The
New England Journal of Medicine 2013;368:2054–7.
43] Ornstein C, et al. Dollars for Docs; 2016 [cited 2016 October 18]; Available from:
https://projects.propublica.org/docdollars/.
44] S. 2029. Physician Payments Sunshine Act of 2007. Washington, DC: Library of
Congress; 2007.
45] Thacker P. The slow pace of success in a Do Something Congress, in Edmond J
Safra Center for Ethics. Harvard University: Cambridge, MA;  2013.
46] Fournier A, Zureik M.  Estimate of deaths due to valvular insufﬁciency
attributable to the use of benﬂuorex in France. Pharmacoepidemiology and
Drug Safety 2012;21(4):343–51.
47] Hill C. Mortalité attribuable au benﬂuorex (Mediator® ). La Presse Médicale
2011;40(5):462–9.
48] Mascret D. Xavier Bertrand 2011: Électrochoc dans le monde du médicament.
Tribunes De La Santé 2014;42(1):47–55.
49] Discussion en procédure accélérée d’un projet de loi dans le texte de la com-
mission, in Sénat. Paris, France: Sénat Francais; 2011.
50] Santé MdAsedl. In: JORF n◦0116, M.d.A.s.e.d.l. Santé, editor. Décret n◦ 2013-
414 du 21 mai 2013 relatif à la transparence des avantages accordés par les
entreprises produisant ou commercialisant des produits à ﬁnalité sanitaire et
cosmétique destinés à l’homme. Paris, France: Legifrance.gouv.fr; 2013.
51] Prescrire Editorial Team. He French Sunshine Act: false transparency. Prescrire
International 2013:223.
52] Conseil d’État N◦ 369074. Paris, France: Legifrance; 2015.
53] Medicines Australia. Medicines Australia sets world-ﬁrst in transparency. Can-
berra, ACT: Medicines Australia; 2008.
54] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission. Transparency is key for drug
industry relationships. Canberra, ACT: Australian Competition & Consumer
Commission; 2009.
55] Shaw B. Do we  a little miss sunshine? The potential impact of the US Sun-
shine Act in Australia. Sydney: Association of Regulatory and Clinical Scientists
(ARCS); 2012.
56] Australian Medical Association. AMA  submission to the Medicines Australia
revised Code of Conduct and proposed industry reporting requirements. Can-
berra, ACT: Australian Medical Association; 2014.
57] Medicines Australia. Another step on the transparency journey for medicines
industry. Canberra, ACT: Medicines Australia; 2013.
58] Cain DM,  Loewenstein G, Moore DA. The dirt on coming clean: perverse effects
of disclosing conﬂicts of interest. Journal of Legal Studies 2005;34(1):1–25.
59] Fadlallah R, Nas H, Naamani D, El-Jardali F, Hammoura I, Al-Khaled L, et al.
Knowledge, beliefs and attitudes of patients and the general public towards the
interactions of physicians with the pharmaceutical and the device industry: a
systematic review. PLoS One 2016;11(8):e0160540.
60] Hwong AR, Sah S, Lehmann LS. The effects of public disclosure of industry
payments to physicians on patient trust: a randomized experiment. Journal
of  General Internal Medicine 2017;32(11):1186–92.
61] Sah S. Conﬂicts of interest and your physician: psychological processes that
cause unexpected changes in behavior. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics
2012;40(3):482–7.
62] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission. Court ﬁnds Nurofen made
misleading speciﬁc pain claims. Canberra, Australia: Australian Competition &
Consumer Commission; 2015.
63] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission. Federal court dismisses
anti-competitive conduct case against Pﬁzer Australia. Canberra, Australia:
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission; 2015.
64] Katz D, Caplan AL, Merz JF. All gifts large and small: toward an understanding of
the ethics of pharmaceutical industry gift giving. American Journal of Biology
2010;10(10):1–17.
65] Grundy Q, Bero L, Malone R. Marketing and the most trusted profession: thenal Medicine 2016;164(11):733–9.
66] Grundy Q, et al. The inclusion of nurses in pharmaceutical industry–sponsored
events: guess who  is also coming to dinner? JAMA Internal Medicine
2016;176(11):1718–20.
